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NEW YORK’S LAW OF TAX MALPRACTICE
DAMAGES: BALANCED OR BIASED?
JACOB L. TODRES†
INTRODUCTION
Generally, in the United States, when a tax advisor is
negligent and causes damages to his or her client, the most
commonly encountered recoverable direct damages include:
(1) additional taxes caused by the negligence, (2) interest paid to
the government on any tax underpayment, (3) penalties imposed
by the government for a tax underpayment, and (4) corrective
costs incurred in attempting to mitigate all or some of the
foregoing damages.1 In New York, the first two types of
damages—additional taxes and interest—are not recoverable.
New York’s position on both of these elements of damages is
based upon principles enunciated in Alpert v. Shea Gould
Climenko & Casey.2
Alpert involved a fraud cause of action asserted against two
law firms involved with a tax shelter in which the plaintiffs
invested and which turned out to be ineffective.3 The claim for
back taxes was dismissed by the trial court on defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.4 The reason for the dismissal was
because the court held that under the facts of Alpert a recovery of
back taxes would put the plaintiffs in a better position than if
they had never invested in the tax shelter at issue.5 With respect
to the recovery of the interest paid by the plaintiff on their tax
underpayment, the First Department reversed the trial court’s
denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this
†
Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of Adam McBeth, class of 2011.
1
Jacob L. Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A Comprehensive Review of the
Elements and the Issues, 61 TAX LAW. 705, 712 (2008). Other types of damages may
also be recoverable in appropriate situations. Id. at 736.
2
160 A.D.2d 67, 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1st Dep’t 1990).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
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issue and held that such interest does not constitute damages;
instead, it merely represents an appropriate charge to the
plaintiffs for the tax money they held during a period of time
when they were not entitled to hold such money.6
In my view, New York’s law should be changed with respect
to both of these elements of damages and both should be
recoverable as a matter of New York negligence law. As to the
recovery of additional taxes, while Alpert’s conclusion that such
taxes were not recoverable was likely correct under its facts,
Alpert was addressing damages recoverable in a fraud cause of
action.7 There is absolutely no reason or justification to extend
this fraud measure of damages to recoveries in negligence causes
of action. Indeed, the application of New York’s well-established
negligence damage principles would permit the recovery of such
additional taxes. The theory of damages in the fraud arena is
very different from the theory of damages in the negligence
arena, and it is inexplicable why the fraud rule was transplanted
into the negligence arena.
As to Alpert’s position on the non-recoverability of interest,
while the court’s position may have been both appropriate under
its facts as well as a progressive divergence from the majority
view at that time, this position should be changed. A recent line
of cases outside New York has developed a more just and
nuanced approach to this issue which permits a plaintiff to
recover the difference, if any, between the interest paid the
government and the actual earnings received by the plaintiff on
the underpaid taxes.8 New York should adopt this position with
respect to the recoverability of interest.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify certain
preliminary matters. With respect to additional taxes, it is very
important to understand that this element of damages addresses
only the additional taxes caused by a tax advisor’s negligence,
not those taxes that a plaintiff would owe in any event. To
illustrate, assume a plaintiff who would owe taxes of $100,000 if
her or his tax return was properly prepared, but who paid taxes
of $120,000 due to the negligence of the tax advisor (that is,
either deductions were omitted or taxable income was
6

Id.
Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
8
See Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 454 (Neb. 2008); see also case cited
infra note 63.
7
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overstated). It is only the recoverability of the additional $20,000
that is addressed. The basic, correct $100,000 of taxes owed the
government may never be collected from the negligent advisor.9
With respect to damages for interest, this refers only to the
interest charge imposed by a government on a tax
underpayment. Whenever a tax advisor’s negligence results in a
tax underpayment by the client, such interest will be incurred
because federal,10 New York,11 and probably most, if not all, other
state laws12 impose an interest charge on tax underpayments.
Other types of interest that might be recoverable in appropriate
tax malpractice situations are not addressed.13
Generally, in a tax malpractice situation in the United
States, where an attorney or accountant was negligent in giving
tax advice, the damages suffered are normally recovered by
means of a malpractice suit. Although many different types of
tort and contract claims are encountered,14 recovery in such
situations is most often obtained under the traditional tort of
negligence.15 The elements of this cause of action generally
include: (1) a duty owed by the defendant attorney or accountant
to the plaintiff, (2) breach of the duty, (3) injuries suffered by the
plaintiff, and (4) proximate causation between the breach of duty
and the injuries.16 Although these four elements generally
comprise the elements of this cause of action, some states, such
as New York, list only three elements—negligence, proximate
cause, and damages—in effect, combining the first two
elements.17 Other states sometimes add a fifth element—
causation in fact.18

9
The text assumes that the statute of limitations has expired and it is no longer
possible to obtain the overpayment by simply filing an amended return.
10
I.R.C. §§ 6621–22 (2006).
11
N.Y. TAX LAW § 684 (McKinney 2009).
12
See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19101 (West 2000); TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. §33.01 (West 1998).
13
See, e.g., Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 912 (Mont.
1990) (interest differential between conventional borrowing and tax-exempt
borrowing); see also Todres, supra note 1, at 753.
14
Todres, supra note 1, at 709–10.
15
Id. at 709; see also BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE
§ 601.1 (6th ed. 2004).
16
Todres, supra note 1, at 709; WOLFMAN ET AL, supra note 15, § 601.2.1.
17
See, e.g., Kaminsky v. Herrick, Feinstein LLP, 59 A.D.3d 1, 9, 870 N.Y.S.2d 1,
7 (1st Dep’t 2008); Estate of Nevelson v. Carro, Spanbock, Kaster & Cuiffo, 259
A.D.2d 282, 283, 686 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (1st Dep’t 1999); see also Solomon v. City of
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In Part I, Alpert will be discussed. Since New York’s law on
the recovery of interest—actually, on the non-recovery of
interest—is more definitively established than its position on the
non-recovery of additional taxes, interest will be discussed first
in Part II and then additional taxes in Part III. A conclusion
follows.
I.

THE ALPERT CASE

In Alpert, the plaintiff19 invested in a tax shelter whose chief
attraction was the immediate deduction of advance minimum
royalty payments for the right to mine coal in the future.20
Originally, the shelter program contained a tax opinion by one of
the defendant law firms suggesting the advance minimum
royalty payment was deductible when made.21 On December 16,
1977, the Income Tax Regulations were amended to disallow a
deduction for such advance royalty payments.22 On December 19,
1977, a Revenue Ruling was issued by the IRS advising that such
advance royalty payments could be deducted only over the period
for which they were paid and not in the year of payment.23 In
light of these developments, the original law firm, on or before
December 21, 1977, withdrew its previous opinion and expressed
doubts as to the immediate deductibility of the payments,
making their earlier opinion useless to the promoter of the tax
shelter.24 On December 20, 1977, the promoters of the tax shelter
obtained an opinion from the second defendant law firm in which
the validity of the Revenue Ruling was questioned.25 Facing a
substantial income tax liability for 1977, the plaintiff invested
over $52,000 in the tax shelter on December 30, 1977 and
claimed a deduction of over $216,000 on his 1977 federal income
New York, 66 N.Y.2d 1026, 1027, 489 N.E.2d 1294, 1294, 499 N.Y.S.2d 392, 392
(1985) (listing the three elements as duty, breach, and proximate injury).
18
See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 124–25 (2d ed. 2011).
19
There were actually two plaintiffs in Alpert, but I will refer to only one
plaintiff to simplify the presentation. Portions of this paragraph are adapted from
Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the Areas in
Which Malpractice Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547, 636–37 (1999).
20
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 69, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312,
313 (1st Dep’t 1990).
21
Id. at 69–70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313–14.
22
Id. at 70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
23
Id.
24
Id., 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
25
Id. at 70–71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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tax return for advance royalty payments.26
The IRS
subsequently disallowed the deduction.27 In December 1986, the
plaintiff paid over $117,400 in back taxes and over $165,800 in
interest.28
In 1984, this action was brought against the defendants for
fraudulent misrepresentation—that is, for fraud.29 The plaintiff
sought to recover lost profits as well as the tax benefits they
would have obtained if they had not relied on the defendants’
opinions and, instead, invested in a viable tax shelter.30 After
extensive discovery, the defendants moved for partial summary
judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for damages for the
recovery of taxes and interest.31 The lower court granted
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment to the extent
of dismissing damage claims for back taxes, but denied the
motion with respect to interest.32 Both of these rulings were
appealed by the losing parties.33
Turning first to the damage claims for back taxes, the First
Department affirmed the lower court’s dismissal. The First
Department’s reasoning was as follows:
The recovery of consequential damages naturally flowing from a
fraud is limited to that which is necessary to restore a party to
the position occupied before commission of the fraud. . . . [I]n
the instant case, recovery of back taxes would place plaintiffs in
a better position than had they never invested in the [tax
shelter].34

The court also refused to consider the tax benefit plaintiff could
have obtained from investing in some other, valid tax shelter

26

Id. at 69, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
Id. at 70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
28
Id. Penalties were not assessed against the plaintiff. Id.
29
Although the opinion notes that plaintiff was “claiming, inter alia, fraudulent
misrepresentation,” id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314, indicating that other claims were
also asserted, the First Department’s opinion refers only to the fraud cause of action
throughout the opinion. See generally id.
30
Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
31
Id. The defendants also moved to dismiss claims for penalties incurred by the
plaintiff, but this is ignored since no penalties were imposed upon the plaintiff. Id. at
70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
32
Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
33
Id. Plaintiff also cross-moved for leave to amend the complaint, but this aspect
of the opinion is ignored since it is not relevant to the issues discussed in this
Article. Id.
34
Id. at 71–72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314–15.
27
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because “[i]t is also well settled that the victim of fraud may not
recover the benefit of an alternative agreement overlooked in
favor of the fraudulent one.”35
As to damages for interest paid to the IRS, the First
Department reversed the lower court and held the recovery of
such amounts was also precluded in New York.
In Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, . . . a case involving violations
of federal securities law, the United States Court of Appeals
found that a defrauded investor in a coal mine tax shelter,
similar to the one herein, was not entitled to recover interest
paid to the IRS upon disallowance of tax deductions. The Court
reasoned that such interest was not damages suffered by
plaintiff but rather was a payment to the IRS for his use of the
money during the period of time when he was not entitled to it.
There is support for such a result in New York case law as
well. . . . Moreover, the equities militate in favor of barring
recovery of such interest rather than allowing plaintiffs the
windfall of both having used the tax monies for seven years and
recovering all interest thereon.36

Although Alpert has been utilized in determining damages
recoverable in tort causes of action,37 it must be noted first and
foremost, that Alpert is purely a fraud case.38 With respect to the
substantive issues, the opinion never even mentionsmuch less
addressesany other possible cause of action that one might
have expected to encounter such as negligence, malpractice,
breach of contract, etc. Also, in analyzing Alpert it is essential to
recognize that Alpert decides three distinct issues, the first two of
which pertain to back taxes: (1) back taxes may not be recovered
as damages; (2) a victim of fraud may not recover the benefit of
an alternative agreement overlooked in favor of the fraudulent
one; and (3) interest paid to the IRS on a tax underpayment is
not recoverable as damages.39

35

Id. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
Id. (citation omitted).
37
See, e.g., Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 384
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), amended by, No. 03 Civ. 6942(SAS), 2004 WL 2403911, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004) (discussing how Alpert is applied by some courts in
malpractice cases).
38
Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
39
Id. at 71–72, 74, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314–16.
36
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Since Alpert seems to have gained the most prominence both
in New York and elsewhere with respect to the nonrecoverability
of interest, I will focus on this issue first.
II. NONRECOVERABILITY OF INTEREST AS DAMAGES
A.

Within New York40

Although Alpert was not decided by the New York Court of
Appeals, it is recognized nevertheless, both inside41 and
outside42of New York, as the case in which New York adopted the
position that interest paid to a government with respect to a tax
underpayment is not recoverable as damages. The reasoning for
this position is that such interest is not damages but simply a
payment for the use of money during a period of time that the
government, not the plaintiff, was entitled to such use. If such
interest were recoverable as damages, the plaintiff would have
the windfall of having both the use of the money and also
recovering the interest thereon.43
Approximately twelve years after Alpert another panel of the
same First Department that decided Alpert decided Jamie
Towers Housing Co. v. William B. Lucas, Inc.,44 which seems
fundamentally inconsistent with Alpert. In Jamie Towers, the
plaintiff, a residential housing cooperative, incurred over
$470,000 in interest when its managing agent failed to timely
pay New York City real estate taxes for the 1991/1992 tax year.45
40
This segment is adapted from Jacob L. Todres, Recovery of Interest on a Tax
Underpayment Caused by a Tax Advisor’s Negligence, 26 AKRON TAX J. 1 (2011)
[hereinafter Recovery of Interest].
41
See, e.g., Shalam v. KPMG LLP, 43 A.D.3d 752, 754, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (1st
Dep’t 2007); Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 283,
835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007); Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger &
Berger, 303 A.D.2d 249, 249, 755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003), aff’d, 44 A.D.3d
554, 844 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1st Dep’t 2007); Blumberg v. Altman, No. 118264/06, 15
Misc. 3d 1140(A), 2007 WL 1519067, at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 25, 2007); Thies
v. Bryan Cave LLP, No. 601036/05, 13 Misc. 3d 1220(A), 2006 WL 2883815, at *4–5
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 14, 2006), aff’d, 35 A.D.3d 252, 826 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep’t
2006).
42
See, e.g., Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 451–53 (Neb. 2008); Amato v.
KPMG LLP, No. 06cv39, 2006 WL 2376245, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006); O’Bryan
v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 637 (S.D. 2006); see also Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at
384.
43
Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
44
296 A.D.2d 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dep’t 2002).
45
Id. at 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
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In this suit the plaintiff was seeking to recover the interest from
its former managing agent and its former accountant. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on defendants’ summary judgment
motion based upon Alpert.46 The First Department reversed,
holding Alpert inapposite. The First Department’s analysis, in
its entirety follows:
Here, however, plaintiff, allegedly through no fault of its own,
was unnecessarily caused to pay $473,043 in interest to the City
due to its managing agent’s failure to timely pay certain real
estate taxes for the 1991/1992 tax year. As such, the recovery of
such interest as an element of its damages would not constitute
an impermissible windfall or put plaintiff in a “better position”
than it was in prior to its managing agent’s alleged misfeasance
and it should be entitled to prove such damages, if any. Those
would ordinarily be measured not by the difference in interest
rates charged by the City and the IRS, but by the actual amount
of interest and late charges paid to the City due to the alleged
misfeasance, subject to any offset of the actual income derived
from the funds in question during the relevant period of time.47

It is very difficult to understand why Alpert is
distinguishable.
In both situations the plaintiff ended up
retaining possession of money he, or it, was not entitled to. In
Jamie Towers it was due to the error of the managing agent in
not paying real estate taxes.48 In Alpert it was due to the error of
the tax advisor in advising the plaintiff that he had legitimate
tax reductions.49 In both situations the plaintiffs had the use of
money until the error was discovered and the money repaid. Yet
in Jamie Towers the First Department held the recovery of
interest was not an impermissible windfall,50 while in Alpert it
held it would be.51
While there are some salient factual differences between the
cases, the differences are inconsequential. For instance, in Alpert
the plaintiff intentionally sought the tax shelter and
intentionally utilized it and paid less taxes than otherwise would
46

Id.
Id. at 359–60, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533–34 (citations omitted).
48
Id. at 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
49
Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 70–71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
50
Jamie Towers, 296 A.D.2d at 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533. In Jamie Towers the
measure of damages adopted by the court was the difference between the interest
paid reduced by the actual income derived from the money during the relevant time.
Id. at 360, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
51
Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
47
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have been payable, while in Jamie Towers the underpayment
arose inadvertently due to an error. Also, Alpert involved
underpayment of income taxes while Jamie Towers involved
underpayment of city real estate taxes. However, these seem to
be distinctions without differences, since in both instances the
end result is identicaleach plaintiff had use of a sum of money
to which he, or it, was not entitled.
Despite the fact that Jamie Towers seems to be
fundamentally inconsistent with Alpert, many later cases simply
cite Alpert for the no-recovery-of-interest proposition and never
even bother to cite Jamie Towers.52 While some cases do address
the existence of Jamie Towers,53 and attempt to distinguish it,
their reasons for distinguishing it do not seem compelling. For
instance, in Thies v. Bryan Cave LLP, a case involving a suit
against two law firms that gave opinions with respect to
investments in an ineffective tax shelter, the court distinguished
Jamie Towers because in Thies the plaintiffs intentionally
decided not to pay the taxes in question.54 It is difficult to
comprehend why this makes any difference. In both instances
the plaintiff had the use of tax money that belonged to the
government. And Jamie Towers held that in such circumstances
a plaintiff may recover as damages the difference between the
interest paid the government and the actual income earned by
the plaintiff on these funds.55
Similarly, in Shalam v. KPMG LLP, which also involved a
suit against a tax advisor for advice to invest in a bad tax shelter,
the First Department held interest was not recoverable based
upon Alpert.56 The court held Jamie Towers was distinguishable
52
Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 283, 835
N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007); Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger,
303 A.D.2d 249, 249, 755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003), aff’d, 44 A.D.3d 554,
844 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1st Dep’t 2007); Blumberg v. Altman, No. 118264/06, 15 Misc. 3d
1140(A), 2007 WL 1519067, at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 25, 2007); Rosenbach v.
Diversified Grp., Inc., No. 602463/2005, 12 Misc. 3d 1152(A), 2006 WL 1310656, at
*6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 10, 2006), aff’d, 85 A.D.3d 569, 926 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st
Dep’t 2011); Williams v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., No. 600808/05, 11
Misc. 3d 1064(A), 2006 WL 684599, at *7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 13, 2006).
53
Shalam v. KPMG LLP, 43 A.D.3d 752, 754–55, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (1st Dep’t
2007); Thies v. Bryan Cave LLP, No. 601036/05, 13 Misc. 3d 1220(A), 2006 WL
2883815, at *4−5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 14, 2006), aff’d, 35 A.D.3d 252, 826
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep’t 2006).
54
Thies, 2006 WL 2883815, at *5.
55
Jamie Towers, 296 A.D.2d at 359–60, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533–34.
56
43 A.D.3d at 753, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 18–19.
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because it involved “negligence by an accountant or other agent
resulting in exposure to liability that would not have been
incurred ‘but for their accountant’s negligence.’ ”57
Again,
whether paying interest for the use of funds one is not entitled to
does or does not constitute recoverable damages should not
depend on how the funds were obtained. Also, the lower court in
Shalam seems to have decided that Alpert governed rather than
Jamie Towers since the facts of Shalam and Alpert were more
analogous, since each involved a bad tax shelter.58
While Alpert has been followed with respect to the nonrecoverability of interest and Jaimie Towers has been virtually
invisible, in Apple Bank for Savings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers,
LLP,59 a trial court within the First Department followed Jamie
Towers and had a very original and novel interpretation limiting
what Alpert stood for with respect to the recoverability of
interest. In Apple Bank, the issue before the court involved
whether the defendant accounting firm gave the plaintiff bank
incorrect advice concerning the tax consequences of a stock
redemption by the bank from the estate of its sole shareholder.
The case arose on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint.60 Although most of the decision
involved statute of limitations issues, one of the grounds asserted
for dismissal was that under Alpert any interest and back taxes
incurred by the bank were not recoverable.61 In denying the
motion for summary judgment, the court combined the issue of
the recoverability of interest together with the issue of the
recoverability of back taxes and treated them together. The court
read Alpert very narrowly to prevent the recovery of interest and
back taxes only where the plaintiff inevitably would have
incurred the tax liability even if the plaintiff had not relied on
the faulty tax advice. “However, if the tax liability would have
been avoided but for the erroneous advice, it appears

57
Id. at 754–55, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (quoting Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d
347, 355 (D.N.J. 1999)).
58
Shalam v. KPMG LLP, No. 112732/05, 13 Misc. 3d 1205(A), 2006 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2380, at *12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 8, 2006), aff’d, 43 A.D.3d 752, 753, 843
N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1st Dep’t 2007).
59
No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1176 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 438, 895 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1st
Dep’t 2010).
60
Id. at *1.
61
Id. at *6.
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that . . . interest would be recoverable in order to make the
plaintiff whole.”62 As authority for this proposition the court
cited Jamie Towers and Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger &
Berger.63 Penner, however, is a very short opinion in which the
court’s entire focus on the recovery of interest—and back taxes—
was to uphold the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of
action “since plaintiff’s tax liability was not attributable to an act
or omission on defendants’ part.”64 This hardly seems an
adequate basis for such a dramatic narrowing of Alpert from
simply holding there is never any recovery of interest in such
situations because the payment of interest does not constitute
damages.
While Apple Bank is a recent and most interesting limitation
of Alpert, (a) it is a lower court holding, (b) Apple Bank was
reversed by the First Department on statute of limitations
grounds,65 (c) Penner seems to be very weak, if any, authority,
and (d) in light of the history of invisibility of Jamie Towers, it is
unclear how strong the Jamie Towers precedent is. Accordingly,
it is impossible to assess whether Apple Bank has effectively
restricted Alpert’s holding with respect to the nonrecoverability
of interest as damages in tax malpractice situations. A lower
court recently did follow Apple Bank on this point.66
B.

The National Picture67

Nationally, three views have developed with respect to the
recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment. The majority
view, which is the more established traditional view, is that such
62
Id. The court’s holding also applied to the recoverability of additional taxes
caused by the defendant’s negligent advice. Id.
63
Id. at *6–7. The court actually cited Penner first as a parenthetical. Id.
64
Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, 303 A.D.2d 249, 249, 755
N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003).
65
Apple Bank for Sav. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 70 A.D.3d 438, 438, 895
N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1st Dep’t 2010) (holding that there was no continuous
representation and therefore the statute of limitations barred plaintiff’s cause of
action).
66
Shaiman v. Carpet One of the Hamptons, Inc., No. BRC 208-08, 27 Misc. 3d
1232(A), 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1551, at *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. June 9, 2010).
67
In Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, I examined in tiresome detail the
development of the various national views on the recovery of interest as damages in
a tax malpractice action. I do not intend to repeat that analysis here. Instead, I hope
to present the conclusion from that study in a somewhat conclusory manner. Anyone
interested in a more detailed analysis is referred to that work. A portion of this
section is adapted from Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 3–6.
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interest is recoverable from a defendant just like any other
damages proximately caused. The minority view, which is the
New York view, absolutely prohibits the recovery of such
interest. This view developed in the decade from approximately
1986 to 1996. A third “modern” view which initially started in
1999 is an intermediate view that permits the recovery of such
interest, but only to the extent it exceeds the interest actually
earned by the plaintiff on the underpaid taxes.68
In Recovery of Interest, I attempted to tally the number of
states following each view based on reported cases.69 Subject to a
number of caveats, I concluded that as of June 2009, thirteen, or,
probably, fourteen states followed the traditional majority view,70
four states—including New York—followed the minority view,71
and seven states plus the federal district court in Oregon
followed the intermediate, “modern” view.72 The starting point in
68

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 15, 17–18, 21, 28–30.
70
These thirteen states are Alabama, Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v.
Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 1064–67 (Ala. 1996); Arizona, Jobe v. Int’l Ins. Co., 933
F. Supp. 844, 860 (D. Ariz. 1995), order withdrawn pursuant to settlement, 1 F.
Supp. 2d 1403, 1403 (D. Ariz. 1997); Florida, Jones v. Childers, No. 88-85-CIV-T22C, 1992 WL 300845, at *12 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 1992), aff’d and rev’d on other
grounds, 18 F.3d 899, 916 (11th Cir. 1994); Illinois, Jerry Clark Equip., Inc. v.
Hibbits, 612 N.E.2d 858, 861–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th 1993); Dail v. Adamson, 570
N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d 1991); Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47, 51,
53, 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 1980); Iowa, Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155–
56 (Iowa 1975); Louisiana, Slaughter v. Roddie, 249 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3d
1971); Maryland, Shofer v. Stuart Hack Co., 723 A.2d 481, 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1999); Nevada, Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282, 1284 n.2 (Nev. 1984); North
Carolina, Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997);
Ohio, Hall v. Gill, 670 N.E.2d 503, 506, 510 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st 1995); Wyatt v. Smith,
Nos. 92 CA 104, 91 CV 400, 1993 WL 518630, at *1, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dec. 15,
1993); Harrell v. Crystal, 611 N.E.2d 908, 913–14 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 1992);
Oklahoma, King v. Neal, 19 P.3d 899, 900–02 (Okla. Civ. App. 4th 2001); Wynn v.
Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Okla. Civ. App. 2d 1991), overruled by Stroud
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 37 P.3d 783, 795 & n.58 (Okla. 2001) (overruled on
another issue); Wisconsin, Merriam v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 98-2522-FT, 1999 WL
326183, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 25, 1999); and, Wyoming, Adel v. Parkhurst, 681
P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1984). The fourteenth state that probably also belongs in this
group is Oregon. See McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414, 419 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998).
71
The other three states are Alaska, Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791, 794
(Alaska 1986); California, Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1235
(E.D. Cal. 1996); and Washington, Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse, 916 P.2d 449,
451 (Wash. Ct. App. 1st 1996).
72
The seven states are Massachusetts, Miller v. Volk, 825 N.E.2d 579, 582
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Nebraska, Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 452–53 (Neb.
2008); New Jersey, Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354–55 (D.N.J. 1999);
69
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analyzing this area is the traditional and majority view that
permitted the recovery of interest on underpaid taxes as a simple
application of traditional tort damage principles.
Under
traditional tort doctrine, a plaintiff may recover all damages
proximately caused by a defendant’s negligence.73 But for
defendant’s negligently incorrect advice that caused the plaintiff
to underpay his taxes, the interest would not have been incurred.
It is therefore held to be recoverable.74
Over time, a great injustice was perceived with the
traditional approach since the recovery of such interest as an
ordinary element of recoverable damages resulted, or could
result, in a windfall for the plaintiff. The plaintiff would now
enjoy both the use of the underpaid tax money and also recover
the interest paid for the use of this money.75 This caused the
birth of the minority view which absolutely prohibited the
recovery of this interest as damages. According to the minority
view, the interest charged for a tax underpayment is not a
penalty imposed on the plaintiff. Instead, it is merely a justified
charge for the use of money belonging to the government that
was wrongfully held by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is permitted
to recover this interest from the defendant, it would result in an
interest-free loan to the plaintiff for the period the taxes were
unpaid.76
While the minority view remedied the problem of unjust
enrichment of the plaintiff, it created a different injustice. It
failed to compensate the plaintiff who did not earn as much with
the underpaid tax money as he paid the government for the use
of this money. By absolutely prohibiting the recovery of interest,
the minority view irrebuttably presumed that the value of the
underpaid tax money to the plaintiff was always exactly equal to
Pennsylvania, Amato v. KPMG LLP, No. 06cv39, 2006 WL 2376245, at *6 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 14, 2006); South Dakota, O’Bryan v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 638–39 (S.D.
2006); Texas, Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734–35 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated by
Finger v. Ray, 326 S.W.3d 285, 292 (Tex. App. 1st 2010) (abrogated on another
issue); and Virginia, Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 384–
85 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 WL
611954, at *38 (D. Or. Mar. 8, 2005), the federal district court adopted the interest
differential approach, but never indicated that this was the Oregon position. See
Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 15.
73
See Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 17.
74
Id. at 26.
75
Id. at 4.
76
Id.
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the interest paid to the government and that these amounts
always net out, leaving no injury and no recoverable damages.77
There are, however, several practical problems with this
assumption. Initially, the minority’s approach assumes the
plaintiff has available money to invest equal to the tax
underpayment, the earnings on which will offset the interest paid
on the tax underpayment. Frequently, a plaintiff will not have
available funds to invest, so there will not be earnings to offset
the interest paid the government.78 Also, even if adequately
liquid, a plaintiff often will not be able to earn a rate of return on
his or her investible funds as high as that charged by the
government. Additionally, there may be significant hardship to a
plaintiff who must make an unexpected payment to the
government that is also ignored by the minority view.79
To remedy these problems inherent in the minority view, the
modern, intermediate view developed that avoided irrebuttable
presumptions and attempted to apply more exacting and precise
justice. Under this modern view, interest could be recovered as
damages, but only when, and to the extent, the interest paid the
government on the tax underpayment exceeded the amount
earned on this money by the plaintiff.80 Proving this interest
differential could be quite burdensome and the placement of the
burden of proof could be determinative of whether any interest
damages would actually be recovered. To address this issue, the
modern view has developed two different approaches with
respect to the placement of the burden of proof. Each state
adopting this view selected the approach most consistent with its
tort law. Under one approach there is a basic assumption that
the victimized plaintiff is entitled to recover all interest paid the
government, but the defendant may present evidence of any
amounts earned by the plaintiff on the tax underpayment in
reduction of plaintiff’s damages. The burden of proof is thus

77

Id. at 6.
Id.; see also Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Okla. Civ. App.
1991), overruled by Stroud v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 37 P.3d 783, 795 & n.58 (Okla.
2001) (overruled on another issue).
79
Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 6; see Caroline Rule, What and When
Can a Taxpayer Recover from a Negligent Tax Advisor?, 92 J. TAX’N 176, 177 (2000).
80
Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 4. The seminal cases for this view are
Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354–55 (D.N.J. 1999), and Streber v.
Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734–35 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Finger v. Ray, 326
S.W.3d 285, 292 (Tex. App. 2010) (abrogated on another issue).
78
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upon the defendant.81 The other approach seems to assume that
generally interest on a tax underpayment is not recoverable, but
if a plaintiff establishes the existence of an interest differential,
the differential is recoverable as damages. The burden of proof is
therefore on the plaintiff.82
C.

Alpert’s No-Interest-Recovery Rule Should Be Changed

New York’s position, adopted in Alpert,83 that interest on a
tax underpayment may not be recovered as damages in a tax
malpractice action should be changed. In accordance with the
national trend, New York should adopt the modern view and
permit the recovery as damages of any differential between the
interest paid the government on a tax underpayment and any
earnings realized on this money by a plaintiff.84 In accordance
with established New York principles that a plaintiff in a tort
action must prove his or her damages,85 New York should impose
the burden of proving the interest differential on the plaintiff.
The weakness of Alpert’s no-interest-recovery position is
especially evident when viewed through a national lens. Of the
three positions nationally on this issue, the no-interest-recovery
position is a very distinct minority view.86 This view has gained
no new adherents since it was originally developed from
approximately 1986 to 1996.87 Furthermore, and more telling,
81
Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 10. This is the approach of Ronson, 33
F. Supp. 2d at 354. O’Bryan v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 639 (S.D. 2006), followed
this approach though it refused to explicitly decide this point.
82
This is the approach of Streber, 221 F.3d at 734–35. Other jurisdictions that
seem to follow this approach include Pennsylvania, Amato v. KPMG LLP, No.
06cv39, 2006 WL 2376245, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006); Nebraska, Frank v.
Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 452–53 (Neb. 2008); Massachusetts, Miller v. Volk, 825
N.E.2d 579, 581 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); and perhaps the United States District for
the District of Oregon, King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 WL
611954, at *37 (D. Or. 2005).
83
Since it is still too early to predict whether Apple Bank for Savings v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1176, at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010), has successfully limited the scope of Alpert’s strict nointerest-recovery position, it will be ignored herein. Regardless of whether Alpert is
still in full force, or somewhat limited, it should be abandoned in favor of the modern
view.
84
This is what Jamie Towers did. See text accompanying notes 44–51.
85
See, e.g., Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 31, 73 N.E. 488, 489 (1905); Quinn
v. Van Pelt, 56 N.Y. 417, 419 (1874).
86
See supra text accompanying notes 67–71.
87
See Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 26.
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since 1999 when the new, more nuanced, and more just modern
view arose, all cases deciding this issue as a matter of first
impression adopted the modern view.88 Outside of New York,
only two cases decided since the advent of the modern view in
1999 have followed the no-interest-recovery view and both did so
under the constraint of stare decisis.89
The no-interest view should be changed not simply as a
matter of blindly following the leader or a current fad, but
because the rationale for the approach is no longer compelling
when compared with the modern view. The critique of the
rationale of the nointerest view by proponents of the modern
intermediate view seems correct. The rationale for the nointerest view enunciated by Alpert is that the interest charge is
not damages but rather a payment for the use of money during a
period of time the plaintiff was not entitled to the money.90 As
indicated above, apart from the question of whether the plaintiff
actually had available to invest an amount equal to the tax
underpayment, the Alpert rationale assumes the plaintiff would
earn a rate of return on the money as high as that charged by the
government for the tax underpayment.91 This assumption is
frequently incorrect, and it seems absurd to elevate the
assumption to an irrefutable presumption. This is especially true
when the existence of any interest differential can effectively be
handled jurisprudentially by imposing the burden of proving it
either on the plaintiff or the defendant as different adherents of
the modern view have done.92

88

See cases cited supra note 72; see also Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at
10, 22.
89
See Fallon v. Locke, Liddell & Sapp, LLP, No. C-04-03210 RMW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67708, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2008); Malone v. Nuber, No. C072046RSL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461, at *49–50 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2008), aff’d
sub nom., Malone v. Ahrens & DeAngeli, PLLC, No. 10-35882, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16091, at *3–6 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2011). Malone is especially noteworthy
because in simply following the earlier case of Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse, 916
P.2d 449, 451 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), it even repeated Leendertsen’s erroneous
statement that the no-interest view is the majority view. Malone, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48461, at *50.
90
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312,
315 (1st Dep’t 1990).
91
See supra text accompanying notes 77–79.
92
See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.
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While Alpert did not dwell at length on the no-interestrecovery issue, but simply adopted the rationale stated in Freschi
v. Grand Coal Venture,93 I believe Alpert was very discerning
and progressive when handed down. At that time the prevailing
view was the majority view that simply awarded interest as a
routine element of recoverable damages. By adopting the
rationale of the federal securities law, Alpert avoided the
injustice inherent in the majority view that resulted in a windfall
to plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Along the way, Alpert
was instrumental in the development of the minority view
nationally.
After adopting the Freschi rationale that interest did not
constitute damages and noting the existence of a New York case
that was arguably consistent, the Alpert court added: “Moreover,
the equities militate in favor of barring recovery of such interest
rather than allowing plaintiffs the windfall of both having used
the tax moneys for seven years and recovering all interest
thereon.”94
This sentence demonstrates that the court was weighing
only two choices: awarding plaintiff all the interest, and thereby
giving him a windfall, or awarding no interest. The court chose
the latter. Apparently, the middle ground that later became the
modern view of awarding plaintiff only the actual interest
differential, thereby eliminating the windfall element, was not on
the court’s radar screen. Today, when the middle ground is
available, it should be the course of choice. The course chosen by
Alpert was simply a reaction—really an overreaction—against
the unjust majority approach at a time when the only perceived
options were to award all interest or no interest.
There is yet an additional reason why Alpert’s no-interestrecovery rule should not be, and, perhaps, never should have
been applied to tax malpractice cases. As will be developed more
fully in Part III, Alpert is purely a fraud case. The opinion does
not even mention any other possible cause of action.95 Tax
malpractice cases are tort cases, typically negligence cases.96
And the measure of damages in each area is very different from
93
767 F.2d 1041, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1015
(1986).
94
Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315 (emphasis added).
95
See generally id.
96
See supra text accompanying notes 14–15.
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the other. In fraud situations the measure of damages in New
York is determined under the “out-of-pocket” rule.97 Under this
rule, damages are determined very narrowly. They are intended
solely to compensate the defrauded party for the difference
between the amount paid and the value of what was received as
of the time of the transaction. What the defrauded party might
have gained, such as lost profits, may not be recovered.98 In
negligence cases, the measure of damages is intended to
compensate the injured party so that he may recover the
difference between what was actually received and what would
have been received with non-negligent performance, including
any lost profit.99
While Alpert held that interest paid a government on
underpaid taxes does not constitute damages and is not
recoverable in a fraud context, perhaps a different result might
have been reached if the broader negligence measure of damages
had been applied. In any event, though perhaps different from
additional taxes, here too a more deliberate and thoughtful
analysis seems required before simply applying a holding from a
fraud case to a negligence situation.
III. ALPERT AND TAXES
A.

Alpert and the Fraud Measure of Damages

In contemplating the impact of Alpert on the issue of
whether taxes incurred by a victim of tax malpractice are
recoverable from a negligent professional, the issue is not really
what Alpert did, but rather what has been done with Alpert.
Alpert involved only a fraud cause of action, and Alpert’s holdings
on the tax issues—that taxes are not recoverable and that any
tax savings that might have been realized from an alternative
investment are not relevant—seem correct, and are a simple
application of traditional New York law as to the fraud measure
of damages. As such, Alpert has been followed in fraud cases100

97

See infra text accompanying notes 105–17 and 123–35.
See infra text accompanying notes 105–17 and 123–35.
99
See infra text accompanying notes 142–57.
100
See, e.g., Huang v. Sy, No. 15155/90, 18 Misc. 3d 1141(A), 2008 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 793, at *12 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Feb. 28, 2008); Superior Technical Res.,
Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 2003-10104, 17 Misc. 3d 1137(A), 2007 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 8053, at *15 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. Dec. 7, 2007); Imaging Int’l v. Hell Graphic
98
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and expressly approved by the New York Court of Appeals.101
However, this fraud measure of damages has been transported to
negligence situations without any analysis, and without even any
acknowledgement that a rule of damages in one area of law is
being extended into another area.102 Based on a simple review of
New York’s approach to damages in the fraud and negligence
areas, it is clear that the fraud measure of damages is not proper
in a negligence context. The fraud approach is problematic both
because it may lead to an incorrect result in any given negligence
situation, but also, and more importantly, even where the correct
ultimate result is reached, because the negligence rule of law
pertaining to damages is being distorted.
Rather than summarize Alpert’s holdings with respect to the
recovery of taxes, it is more efficient to simply quote them since
the entire holdings on taxes are contained in two paragraphs. To
briefly review the facts, with respect to the recovery of taxes
incurred by the plaintiff who purchased an invalid tax shelter
about which the defendant law firms had given opinions, the
lower court in Alpert granted the defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim for back taxes. In
affirming this portion of the lower court’s holding, Alpert stated:
The IAS court was correct in rejecting plaintiffs’ damage
claims for back taxes. The recovery of consequential damages
naturally flowing from a fraud is limited to that which is
necessary to restore a party to the position occupied before
commission of the fraud. . . . In Cayuga Harvester, the Fourth
Department found that the destruction of the plaintiffs’ crop
was a direct result of defendants’ fraud and placed plaintiff in a
far worse position than had it not purchased the equipment. By
contrast, in the instant case, recovery of back taxes would place
plaintiffs in a better position than had they never invested in
the [tax shelter].

Sys., Inc., No. 005062/1992, 17 Misc. 3d 1123(A), 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7368, at *8
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 29, 2007).
101
Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 422–23, 668 N.E.2d
1370, 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 80–81 (1996).
102
See, e.g., Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282,
282–83, 835 N.Y.S.3d 178, 178 (1st Dep’t 2007); Shaiman v. Carpet One of The
Hamptons, Inc., No. BRC 208-08, 27 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1551,
at *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. June 9, 2010); Apple Bank for Sav. v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1176, at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010).
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It is also well settled that the victim of fraud may not
recover the benefit of an alternative agreement overlooked in
favor of the fraudulent one. Hence, plaintiffs’ argument that
but for the fraud they would have invested in some other tax
shelter must fail.103

What is very clear from this excerpt is that Alpert is opining
as to damages recoverable in a fraud cause of action. The court
reiterates several times that it is addressing the “damages
naturally flowing from a fraud” and what “the victim of fraud”
may or may not recover.104 As such, the opinion is simply
following well-settled precedent and is not especially noteworthy
except, perhaps, as to its application in a tax shelter situation.
In New York, the current view of the damages recoverable in
a fraud action dates back over ninety years to Reno v. Bull.105
Reno involved a suit to recover damages for fraud and deceit by a
plaintiff who was induced to purchase stock in a corporation
based upon misrepresentations of the corporation’s assets and
prospects. In setting forth the correct measure of damages, the
New York Court of Appeals held the purpose of damages in such
situations is to indemnify the injured party “for the actual
pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong.”106 No
element of profit may be awarded. Under the facts of Reno, such
damages would be the difference between the $5,000 paid for the
stock and the actual value of the stock received.107
Almost nine years after Reno the New York Court of Appeals
revisited this issue, again in the context of a suit for damages
sustained when the plaintiff was induced by fraudulent
representations to purchase a bond for investment.108
In
Hotaling, the court reaffirmed its holding in Reno that the
measure of damages for fraud “is indemnity for the actual
pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong”109 and
that ordinarily, when fraud induced the purchase of property, the
damages would be the difference between the amount paid and

103

Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 71–72, 559 N.Y.S.2d
312, 314–15 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citations omitted).
104
Id.
105
226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919).
106
Id. at 553, 124 N.E. at 146.
107
Id. at 552–53, 124 N.E. at 146. The court also permitted the recovery of
interest. Id. at 553, 124 N.E. at 146.
108
Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 159 N.E. 870 (1928).
109
Id. at 87, 159 N.E. at 871 (quoting Reno, 226 N.Y. at 553, 124 N.E. at 146).
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the value of the property received.110 The court went on to
explain the reason for this is that the seller’s fraud is normally
completed at the time of sale of the property. Any subsequent
changes in value of the article are due to later decisions, such as,
whether to hold or dispose the asset, and are not attributable to
the fraud at the time of the sale.111 The court went on to caution
that the fraud measure of damages was not intended to be
inflexible, and that even consequential damages might be
appropriate: “Proximate damages may not be fixed by arbitrary
rule. Sometimes other damages flow from fraud in inducing a
purchase, besides the difference between the price paid and the
value of the article received. Consequential damages may also be
awarded.”112
Only eight years after Hotaling, the Court of Appeals again
reiterated its Reno articulation of the measure of damages for
fraud.
Sager v. Friedman involved a plaintiff who was
fraudulently induced to lend money to a corporation.113 The
president of the corporation had obtained the loan, in part by
giving as security for the loan certain shares of stock of another
corporation he owned.114 He misled the plaintiff as to the value of
the security shares by failing to inform him of certain substantial
debt owed by that corporation.115 In distinguishing the measure
of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation from that for breach
of contract the court stated that in fraud situations, the injury is
the inducement to make a contract that would not otherwise
have been made.116 The court added that all profit elements are
excluded from damages and that damages consist solely of
“indemnity for the actual pecuniary loss sustained as a direct
result of the wrong” and that this is “the difference between the
value of the bargain which a plaintiff was induced by fraud to
make and the amount or value of the consideration exacted as
the price of the bargain.”117

110

Id. at 87–88, 159 N.E. at 871.
Id. at 88, 159 N.E. at 871.
112
Id. at 92, 159 N.E. at 873.
113
270 N.Y. 472, 477–78, 1 N.E.2d 971, 972–73 (1936).
114
Id. at 476, 1 N.E.2d at 971–72.
115
Id. at 477, 1 N.E.2d at 972.
116
Id. at 481, 1 N.E.2d at 974 (“[T]he measure of damages is indemnity for loss
suffered through that inducement.”).
117
Id. (citing Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 553, 124 N.E. 144, 146 (1919)).
111
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With the measure of damages for fraud having been firmly
established by the Court of Appeals and having since been
applied by the lower courts,118 the holding in Alpert was very
much in line with the New York precedent.119 When the plaintiff
in Alpert was defrauded when sold an ineffective tax shelter, all
he was entitled to was the difference between what he paid and
what he received—presumably the amount paid less any value of
the tax shelter assets.120 Of course, he could not recover any tax
benefits sought, since that type of recovery would give him the
benefit of what he was promised, which is precisely what Reno
held was not recoverable.121 Similarly, since a plaintiff in a fraud
suit is only entitled to be made whole as of the time of the
transaction, such a plaintiff cannot be heard to argue that he
could have invested in an alternative arrangement that would
have provided him with an effective tax shelter, since that would
be the recovery of either profit or of indirect consequential
damages. In addition, the existence or availability of such an
alternative arrangement would normally be undeterminable and
speculative, and not recoverable for these reasons as well.122
Subsequent to Alpert, the New York Court of Appeals again
reiterated that the measure of damages for fraud in New York is
still the Reno “out-of-pocket” rule and also approved Alpert’s
holding that in such cases there is no recovery of any income
taxes paid.123 In Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., the
plaintiffs were a group of corporations which owned almost
twenty-five percent of the defendant Smith Barney Inc., a
brokerage firm.124 Giving in to pressure by the defendant, the
plaintiff agreed to vote its shares in the defendant in favor of a
118
See, e.g., Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 22–23,
465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 618 (4th Dep’t 1983).
119
See Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 74, 559 N.Y.S.2d
312, 316 (1st Dep’t 1990).
120
Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
121
In Reno, the measure of damages utilized by the lower court that was
overturned was “the difference between the value of the stock at the time it was sold
to [plaintiff] . . . and the value of the stock as it would have been at that time if the
representations were true.” Reno, 226 N.Y. at 552–53, 124 N.E. at 146.
122
See, e.g., Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 422, 668
N.E.2d 1370, 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 80 (1996); Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel
Martinique Assocs., 12 N.Y.2d 339, 344, 190 N.E.2d 10, 12–13, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660,
664 (1963).
123
Lama Holding Co., 88 N.Y.2d at 421–23, 668 N.E.2d at 1373–74, 646
N.Y.S.2d at 80–81.
124
Id. at 418, 668 N.E.2d at 1372, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
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merger of the defendant into another entity, and to otherwise not
block the merger.125 When the plaintiff was originally structured
to hold the Smith Barney stock on behalf of foreign investors, it
was structured so that any sales of the stock at a profit would not
be subject to United States income taxation.126 Unbeknownst to
the plaintiffs, the law was changed about six months before the
merger and the plaintiffs later learned they had an unexpected
tax liability of $33 million.127 They then brought this action
asserting their consent to the merger was fraudulently induced,
and seeking the $33 million as damages.128 Although the Court
of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of
plaintiffs’ action, it extensively discussed the fraud measure of
damages.129
In Lama, the Court of Appeals, citing Reno, stated that
“ ‘[t]he true measure of damage[s] is indemnity for the actual
pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong’ or
what is known as the ‘out-of-pocket’ rule.”130 Under this rule, the
court continued, the loss is computed as the difference between
what the plaintiff paid and the value of what it received.131 A
plaintiff could recover its losses but not what it might have
gained nor any profit it might have realized absent the fraud.132
Under the facts of Lama, the court held there were no damages
because the price received for the Smith Barney stock in the
merger was twice the shares’ fair market value.133 Any possible
alternative arrangement that might have avoided the United
States income tax could not be a basis for damages, since such
arrangement was “undeterminable and speculative.”134 As to
recovery of the taxes paid, the court stated these may not be
recovered under the “out-of-pocket” rule, and endorsed Alpert’s
analysis that the recovery of such taxes would put Lama in a

125

Id. at 419–20, 668 N.E.2d at 1372, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 78–79.
Id. at 418–19, 668 N.E.2d at 1372, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
127
Id. at 420, 668 N.E.2d at 1372–73, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
128
Id. at 419–20, 668 N.E.2d at 1372–73, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 79. There were also a
number of other causes of action asserted.
129
Id. at 421–23, 668 N.E.2d at 1373–74, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 79–81.
130
Id. at 421, 668 N.E.2d at 1373, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 422, 668 N.E.2d at 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
134
Id.
126
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better position than if it had retained the shares.135 Such
amounts apparently are beyond what is necessary to restore the
plaintiff to the position occupied before the fraud.
B.

New York’s Negligence Measure of Damages

In attempting to ascertain the New York measure of
damages in a negligence cause of action—excluding personal
injury situations—I was struck by the fact that there does not
appear to be a clear, well-defined articulation of a standard that
one may easily point to. Unlike the fraud measure of damages
that has been reaffirmed many times by the Court of Appeals
and has an attractive short-hand label, the “out-of-pocket” rule,
the negligence measure of damages is difficult to articulate. A
simple analog to the fraud’s “out-of-pocket” label does not seem to
exist. Similarly, the cases seem to raise different formulations of
the measure of damages. While the cases seem to want to make
the plaintiff whole, they often do not explain their concept of
“whole.”
For instance, does “whole” include any profit or
consequential gains that non-negligent performance would have
generated, or is it limited to actual pecuniary loss, akin to the
fraud’s “out-of-pocket” measure of damages? A very poignant
illustration of this is Solin v. Domino.136 In Solin, the plaintiff
was given incorrect advice by his insurance agent/financial
advisor and by the insurance company as to the tax consequences
of cashing in an annuity policy. When it turned out the tax bill
was $600,000 rather than the promised $200,000, the plaintiff
sued for damages.137 Since the defendant “conceded that he had
made a ‘mistake,’ ”138 the issue on the defendant’s motion to
dismiss centered on damages. While there were a number of
potentially interesting side issues raised in the opinion, the
federal trial judge, sitting in diversity, applied the fraud, out-ofpocket measure of damages,139 and rather directly sidestepped

135

Id. at 422–23, 668 N.E.2d at 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 80–81.
No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009).
137
Id. at *1. The plaintiff also argued that if he were furnished accurate
information about his potential tax liability, he would have rolled over his annuity
into another annuity thereby deferring all tax liability. Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at *4.
136
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addressing the New York negligence measure of damages:
“[t]abling the legal question whether benefit-of-the-bargain
damages are recoverable in a negligence action under New York
law.”140
Although perhaps not glaringly obvious, and lacking a catchy
label, the New York measure of damages in malpractice
situations involving attorneys and accountants is very different
from the fraud “out-of-pocket” approach. The recovery available
to an injured party is the difference between what was obtained
by the plaintiff and what would have been obtained with nonnegligent performance.141
In Flynn v. Judge, the plaintiffs were removed as executors
and trustees of the estate of their father.142 They brought this
action against the defendant, who was their attorney, claiming
his negligent advice caused them to lose their positions and the
income they would have received.143 In reviewing the trial court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, the Second
Department stated, “[T]he measure of damages is the difference
in the pecuniary position of the client from what it should have
been had the attorney acted without negligence.”144 The court
then quoted the following:
In actions against attorneys for negligence or wrongs, the debt
lost and cost sustained through their negligence furnish, when
the action can be maintained, the obvious measure of damages,
where this measure definitely exists. In other cases the plaintiff
is entitled to be in the same position as if the attorney had done
his duty.145

In Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe,146 the New
York Court of Appeals addressed the proper measure of damages
in an attorney malpractice situation.147 The majority’s opinion
140

Id. at *3.
Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 279, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 795–96 (2d Dep’t 1912).
142
Id. at 278, 133 N.Y.S. at 794.
143
Id. at 279, 133 N.Y.S. at 795–96.
144
Id. at 280, 133 N.Y.S. at 796.
145
Id. (quoting EDWARD P. WEEKS, TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS
AT LAW § 319 (2d ed. 1892)).
146
76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990).
147
The issue before the court was whether in a legal malpractice action the
defendant attorney could offset against any recoverable damages the contingent fee
provided for in the retainer agreement concerning the underlying personal injury
claim. Id. at 39, 555 N.E.2d at 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 239. Here the defendant
attorney settled the plaintiff’s personal injury claim with the insurer of the car that
141
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was ambiguous concerning the precise scope of damages
recoverable. It stated that where a plaintiff asserts causes of
action in both negligence and contract, the measure of damages
in a legal malpractice action is generally the same.148 “The object
of compensatory damages is to make the injured client whole.
Where the injury suffered is the loss of a cause of action, the
measure of damages is generally the value of the claim lost.”149
While the majority’s opinion is not specific about what it means
to make the injured client “whole,” the concurrence by Judge
Kaye was much more explicit:
In lawyer malpractice cases, as in all negligence cases, the focus
in damages inquiries must be on the injured plaintiff—not on
whether damages will unduly harm the wrongdoer defendant—
the objective being to put the injured plaintiff in as good a
position as she would have been in had there been no breach of
duty.150

In Sanders v. Rosen,151 another attorney malpractice case,
the court seemed to spell out what it means to make an injured
party whole, writing “damages for malpractice are also limited to
pecuniary loss—i.e., the difference between the actual result
achieved and that which should have been accomplished, and the
financial loss thereby sustained.”152
Finally, the well-known New York requirement, that in a
malpractice suit against an attorney for the loss of a cause of
action there often needs to be a trial within a trial,153 is simply a
direct application of this measure of damages. The “trial” of the
underlying lost cause of action within the malpractice trial is
simply the method utilized to establish what the negligent

hit the plaintiff. The attorney failed to give notice of the accident to the plaintiff’s
insurer, thereby losing coverage under plaintiff’s policy with much higher limits. Id.
at 40–41, 555 N.E.2d at 612, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
148
Id. at 42, 555 N.E.2d at 613, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 45–46, 555 N.E.2d at 615, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
151
159 Misc. 2d 563, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1993).
152
Id. at 572, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
153
See, e.g., McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 280 A.D.2d 79, 82, 720 N.Y.S.2d
654, 656–57, (4th Dep’t 2001); 3 Cottage Place LLC v. Cohen, Tauber, Spievack &
Wagner, LLP, No. 0118036/2005, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8343, at *10–11 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. Feb. 21, 2008); Alva v. Hurley, Fox, Selig, Caprari & Kelleher, 156 Misc.
2d 550, 555, 593 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (Sup. Ct. Rockland Cnty. 1993).
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attorney should have accomplished, which is the reference point
in defining the extent of the recoverable injury suffered by the
injured plaintiff.
While the malpractice or negligence measure of damages
seems identical with the “benefit-of-the-bargain” rule of damages
utilized in breach of contract cases in New York,154 and since the
cases do not affix the “benefit-of-the-bargain,” or, indeed, any
label to this measure of damages,155 I will refer to them as
“expectancy” damages—the difference between the expected nonnegligent performance of the tax advisor and actual performance.
While, perhaps, all of the intricacies of New York expectancy
damages in tax malpractice situations may not yet have been
addressed,156 it seems clear that such expectancy damages are
much broader than “out-of-pocket” damages available in fraud
actions. In fraud actions the plaintiff is generally made whole by
receiving the difference between what he received and what he
gave up. Profits that may have been anticipated are not
recoverable. In expectancy damages the plaintiff may recover the
entire difference between what the expected, non-negligent
performance would have resulted in and what was actually
received.157 This does not exclude recovery of any expected
profits, as “out-of-pocket” fraud damages does.
Where the advice sought is tax advice, it would seem
inevitable that expectancy damages would include any extra
taxes caused by the advisor’s negligence. While authority in New

154
The classic description of breach of contract damages is contained in Sager v.
Friedman, 270 N.Y. 472, 1 N.E.2d 971 (1936): “The measure of damages which flows
from a breach of contract is the difference between the value of what has been
received under the contract and the value of what would have been received if the
contract had been performed according to its terms. . . . The injured party is entitled
to the benefit of his bargain as written and is entitled to damages for the loss caused
by failure to perform the stipulated bargain.” Id. at 481, 1 N.E.2d at 974. This seems
virtually identical with the definition of attorney malpractice damages as the
difference between the injured party’s position and “what it should have been had
the attorney acted without negligence.” Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133
N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d Dep’t 1912).
155
See, e.g., Solin v. Domino, No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 25, 2009). In this case a federal judge specifically sidestepped whether benefitof-the-bargain damages are recoverable in negligence in New York. Id. at *3.
156
See generally Todres, supra note 1.
157
Any costs incurred would also be recoverable. Sanders, 159 Misc. 2d at 572,
605 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
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York on this may be scarce,158 there are many examples of such
recoveries in other states. For instance, recovery of additional
taxes has been awarded where: (1) an attorney for an estate filed
the estate tax return late, thereby preventing the estate from
utilizing the alternate valuation date;159 (2) an attorney/return
preparer advised that certain deductions be taken in a later year
and when the error was discovered it was too late to file amended
returns for the earlier years in which the deductions should have
been claimed;160 (3) an “attorney” failed to obtain long-term
capital gain treatment that was obtainable with better
planning;161 and (4) erroneous advice resulted in the receipt of
taxable rather than tax-free disability benefits.162
The crucial issue in expectancy damages is to distinguish
between additional taxes caused by the negligence and those
taxes that are unconnected with the negligence and which would
have been incurred in any event. The former are recoverable, the
latter are not.163
The [plaintiffs] were, and are, under a legal duty to pay
taxes . . . . We note that if the malpractice action ripens, the
appropriate measure of damages is the difference between what
the [plaintiffs] would have owed in any event if the tax returns
were properly prepared, and what they owe now because of
their accountants’ negligence, plus incidental damages. The
[plaintiffs] should not recover as damages all taxes owed . . . .164

158
See, e.g., Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP v. Munao, 270 A.D.2d
150, 704 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep’t 2000).
159
Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Iowa 1975).
160
King v. Neal, 19 P.3d 899, 900 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
161
Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah LLP, No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 WL 31862712, at *3
(Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002). Here the individual defendant was not actually an
attorney though he was held out to be an attorney and of counsel at the defendant
law firm. The court treated him as if he were an attorney. Id. at *8.
162
Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v. Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 1066–67 (Ala.
1996). For other examples, see Todres, supra note 1, at 713–14.
163
See Todres, supra note 1, at 712–13.
164
Thomas v. Cleary, 768 P.2d 1090, 1091 n.5 (Alaska 1989); see also Hosfelt v.
Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5506, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22,
2000) (“Although necessary taxes may not constitute an injury to a client’s interests,
taxes which could have been avoided by the exercise of the knowledge, skill and
ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by legal professionals under similar
circumstances can be considered as an injury.”).
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Extension of Alpert’s Fraud Measure of Damages to the
Negligence Arena

Although the measure of damages in fraud is so very
different from the measure of damages in negligence, a number
of cases have ignored this difference and simply relied upon
Alpert in deciding negligence cases.165 It seems almost beyond
comprehension why the courts do not even acknowledge, much
less explain why, they are taking a rule from one area of law and
are simply applying it in another, very different area. To make
matters worse, they are also ignoring long-established precedent
in the negligence area. Perhaps the most egregious example is
Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co.166 Gertler
involved an action against an accountant for professional
malpractice. Fraud was never even mentioned in the opinion. In
affirming the trial court’s directed verdict dismissing the
complaint, the First Department, citing only Alpert, held simply,
“taxes and tax interest are not recoverable under New York
law.”167 While Gertler said so, there simply is no such rule in the
negligence arena.
Similarly, in Solin v. Domino,168 a federal district court
sitting in diversity and applying New York law simply applied
the fraud “out-of-pocket” rule as the measure of damages for a
negligence and malpractice cause of action.169 The court then
proceeded to hold, citing Alpert, that the defendant could not
recover his tax payment because that would place him “in a
better position than he held prior to the misrepresentation.”170
Again, this does not seem to be an accurate statement of the
Flynn v. Judge expectancy rule of damages in the negligence
arena.

165
See, e.g., Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282,
283, 835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007); Shaiman v. Carpet One of The
Hamptons, Inc., No. BRC 208-08, 27 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1551,
at *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. June 9, 2010); Apple Bank for Sav. v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 WL
1363026, at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010); see also Solin v. Domino, No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009
WL 536052, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009).
166
40 A.D.3d 282, 835 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1st Dep’t 2007).
167
Id. at 283, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
168
No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009).
169
Id. at *3.
170
Id.
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While Alpert, under its facts, may have been correct not to
award back taxes to the plaintiffs because any such award would
have put them in a better position than if they had never
invested in the tax shelter at issue,171 there is no reason for the
result in this particular fraud situation to be both transplanted
to the negligence area and also to be elevated into an across-theboard rule of law. For instance, under the Flynn v. Judge
measure of damages, the additional taxes incurred due to a tax
advisor’s negligence in the following previously mentioned
illustrative situations should be recoverable just as they were
held to be recoverable in other states:
1. where the benefit of utilizing the alternate valuation date for
estate tax purposes was lost due, to the late filing of the
estate tax return by the estate’s attorney;172
2. where the tax advisor incorrectly advises a deduction be
taken in a later year rather than in the proper earlier year
and the benefit of the deduction is lost;173
3. where a client fails to obtain favorable long term capital gain
treatment that otherwise would have been available because
the advisor miscalculated the holding period necessary to
obtain long term treatment;174 and
4. where an advisor gives incorrect advice as to how to purchase
insurance coverage and the benefits later received are
taxable rather than tax-free.175

In each situation, the additional taxes would not have been
incurred but for the advisor’s negligence, and should be
recoverable.
Similarly, while Alpert’s holding “that the victim of fraud
may not recover the benefit of an alternative agreement
overlooked in favor of the fraudulent one”176 may have been
171
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 71–72, 559 N.Y.S.2d
312, 314–15 (1st Dep’t 1990). The court never explained what it meant by this
statement. In fraud, the purpose of damages is to restore the party to the position
occupied immediately before the commission of the fraud. Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
314. Presumably, any recovery of taxes would enrich the plaintiff vis-à-vis never
having invested in the tax shelter, notwithstanding the shelter’s promise of a large
tax reduction.
172
See, e.g., Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Iowa 1975).
173
See, e.g., King v. Neal, 19 P.3d 899, 900–01 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
174
See, e.g., Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah LLP, No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 WL
31677458, at *3 (Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002).
175
See, e.g., Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v. Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061,
1066–67 (Ala. 1996).
176
Alpert, 160 A.D.2d. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
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correct in that case, this too should not be extended as absolute
doctrine in the negligence area. In Alpert, the attorneys who
rendered opinions concerning the subject tax shelter had
absolutely no connection with, or even notice of, what other
investments the investors might have been considering. The
alternative investment was completely extraneous to the
defendants’ role in the shelter at issue. Contrast this with a
situation in which a layman who is considering investing in one
of two tax shelters seeks advice from an expert as to which
shelter is efficacious. Here, if the advisor, due to negligence,
advises the purchase of option B rather than option A and it
turns out that B is invalid while A is valid, the additional taxes
incurred ought to be recoverable. But for the negligence, the
client’s pecuniary position would have been better by the taxes
that could have been saved.
Solin v. Domino provides an interesting case study in the
jurisprudential mischief created by applying Alpert’s fraud
measure of damages in the negligence arena.177 In Solin the
basic analysis is flawed, since the court utilized the fraud
measure of damages rather than the negligence measure of
damages in dismissing the plaintiff’s cause of action on a motion
to dismiss. However, the alternative holding in Solin that the
plaintiff cannot recover any damages since the only damages
asserted were speculative, might plausibly be a correct result,
even if the proper legal standard had been applied.
In Solin, the plaintiff,178 under the federal court’s diversity
jurisdiction, sued his insurance agent/financial advisor for
professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation.179 The
crux of the complaint was that the defendant understated the tax
that would be incurred if the plaintiff were to cash in his annuity
policy. The plaintiff had an annuity worth approximately $3.2

177

No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009).
There were actually two plaintiffs in Solin: Daniel Solin, individually, and as
trustee of the Daniel R. Solin Trust. Id. at *1. For ease of presentation, they are
treated as one plaintiff since the issues for both were identical and the court also
treated them as one.
179
Id. at *1. In the final footnote of the opinion the court noted that since the
plaintiff’s cause of action was defective because it failed to assert any recoverable
damages, the court did not need to address the defendant’s alternative argument
that New York law does not recognize a professional malpractice cause of action
against financial advisors. Id. at *4 n.7. The discussion herein also does not address
this contention.
178
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million. The plaintiff was contemplating one of two courses of
action: whether to (1) surrender the annuity, pay the taxes and
invest the balance in a taxable account; or (2) roll over the
annuity tax-free into another annuity.180 If the second option was
selected, no taxes would be currently incurred, but would be
deferred until the new annuity was cashed in. Based on the
defendant’s advice that approximately $200,000 of taxes would
be incurred currently if option one was chosen and the annuity
cashed in, the plaintiff chose option one. It later turned out that
the actual tax liability was over $600,000 rather than the advised
$200,000. When confronted about the discrepancy, the defendant
admitted that he had made a mistake. This suit was commenced
because the plaintiff asserted he would have selected the second
option if he had been given accurate advice.181
At the beginning of its analysis, the court in Solin noted that
to recover under either of the asserted causes of action, the
plaintiff would have to prove proximate and actual damages.182
Speculative damages were not recoverable under New York
law.183 The court noted that damages were speculative when the
fact that damages were incurred is uncertain, not merely when
the amount of the damages was in dispute.184
The applicable measure of damages, according to Solin, was
that “[a] victim of negligence and malpractice may recover his
out-of-pocket expenses that flow from the wrongful conduct (i.e.,
indemnity for actual pecuniary loss).”185 The court went on to
hold that taxes were not recoverable by the plaintiff for two
reasons: first, based on Lama Holding Co.,186 because the tax
liability was caused by plaintiff having recognized taxable gain,
not because of any misrepresentation by the defendant187; and
180

Id. at *1; see I.R.C. § 1035 (2006).
Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *1.
182
Id. at *2.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at *3.
186
Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 668 N.E.2d 1370, 646
N.Y.S.2d 76 (1996).
187
Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *3. It should be noted that in Solin, the plaintiff
first solicited and received the tax advice before cashing in the annuity. Id. at *1.
This is in contrast to the situation in Alpert in which the plaintiff engaged in his
normal economic endeavors during all of 1977 and purchased the tax shelter on
December 30th of that year. Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67,
69, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (1st Dep’t 1990).
181
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second, because any recovery of taxes would put the plaintiff in a
better position than he held prior to the misrepresentation. For
this latter proposition the court relied on Alpert.188
With all due respect, the court utilized the fraud measure of
damages of both Lama Holding and Alpert as the rule of
recoverable damages for the torts of professional malpractice and
negligent misrepresentation. The court did not even note the
transplantation of a fraud rule into the negligence area. Even
worse, the court seems to have elevated statements in each of the
fraud cases that may have been perfectly appropriate in their
original contexts and made them into absolute tort rules that
have no basis and make no sense in the tort arena. These rules
are that taxes may never be recovered under the out-of-pocket
rule—which does not apply in tort cases—and that a recovery of
back taxes would always put a plaintiff in a better position than
before the wrong.189 Finally, it is suggested that the court’s
approach, if followed, will make it impossible to ever recover the
most elemental type of damages incurred in a tax malpractice
context—additional taxes.
Solin also gave short shrift to the plaintiff’s alternative
argument that he ought to be able to recover as damages the
difference between the taxes incurred on cashing in the annuity
and what he would have incurred by utilizing the other option of
deferring the taxes by exchanging the annuity for another
annuity. According to the court, such damages were speculative
and not recoverable. They were speculative because the amount
of taxes ultimately incurred is not knowable because they will
depend upon such factors as when the future tax liability will be
incurred, what the plaintiff’s tax rate will be at that time, and
whether there will have been any changes in—perhaps even
elimination of—the tax law.190 The court also rejected the
plaintiff’s attempt to shift the speculativeness problem to the
defendant by arguing that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
the full $600,000 of taxes currently paid and if the defendant
wanted to reduce this amount by any taxes that would be saved
in the future as a result of the present tax payment, the
defendant had the burden of proof on this offset. Since the

188
189
190

Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *3.
Id.
Id.
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defendant certainly could not prove the amount of any offset due
to its inherent speculativeness, the plaintiff, it was argued,
should therefore be able to recover all the taxes paid currently.191
It is suggested that a correct analysis of the Solin facts
would be as follows: Initially, the proper measure of damages in
this malpractice situation would be, not the fraud out-of-pocket
rule, but the expectancy—really, benefit-of-the-bargain—
measure of damages of Flynn v Judge.192 Under this rule of
damages, a plaintiff could recover the difference between what
his pecuniary position would have been if the tax advice were
non-negligent and his present pecuniary situation.193 If extra
taxes were caused by the negligent advice, such amounts would
be recoverable.
Applying this rule to the Solin facts, it is clear, as the court
found, that there was no issue as to the defendant’s negligence or
proximate cause. The only issue for decision was damages—
whether the plaintiff proved his damages. At this point, Solin’s
analysis of the plaintiff’s alternative argument and the court’s
discussion of the speculativeness of the damages and who has the
burden of proof is completely apropos. It would be a perfectly
proper result for the court to hold that in New York the plaintiff
has the burden of proving damages as an element of his cause of
action.194 And, to do so, the plaintiff had to establish the
difference between the currently incurred taxes, and what would
have been incurred had he chosen the other option of deferring
his taxes by rolling over his old annuity into a new one. Not
being able to prove this amount because of the speculativeness of
the future taxes and not being able to shift this burden of proof
onto the defendant, the Solin result of granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss would be correct, or at least, arguably
correct.195
Although the lower court in Apple Bank for Savings v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP196 also applied Alpert in a tort
context, the opinion is noteworthy and merits discussion for two
191

Id.
Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d Dep’t 1912).
193
Id.
194
See Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *3 (citing Noah v. Harding, No. 2002-1351 QC,
2003 WL 21974989, at *1 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep’t 2003).
195
See Todres, supra note 1, at 758–65 (discussing this issue more fully).
196
No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 WL 1363026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010).
192
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reasons. First, and most importantly, the court seems to have
instinctively fathomed the correct standard for when taxes ought
to be recoverable in tort situations and it interpreted Alpert and
some its progeny as standing for this result. Second, as did a
number of other cases,197 the court combined its analysis of the
recovery of taxes and of interest and treated them as a unit.
While taxes and interest are often considered together,198 it is
suggested that under Alpert this is not correct since the
underlying rationale for each item is very different. It is also
suggested that while the court’s conclusion as to the
recoverability of taxes may have reached an ultimately correct
result, its conclusion as to interest was not correct.
As discussed previously,199 in Apple Bank the plaintiff bank
alleged that the defendant, its accounting firm, gave it incorrect
advice as to the tax consequences of redeeming stock from the
estate of its deceased sole shareholder. As a result it incurred
additional taxes and interest.200 The defendant moved for
summary judgment dismissing the complaint, primarily on
statute of limitations grounds and also because back taxes and
interest are not recoverable under New York law.201
In
addressing the latter issue, the court commenced its analysis
with Alpert’s holding that the plaintiff could not recover the back
taxes and interest “because plaintiff inevitably would have
incurred the tax liability if it had not invested in the disallowed
tax shelter.”202 Addressing the recovery of both back taxes and
interest, the court concluded that under New York law back
taxes and interest are recoverable if the plaintiff’s tax liability
would have been avoided but for the erroneous advice. Where
the tax liability was inevitable, the court held there can be no
recovery of interest and taxes since a recovery would create a
windfall for the plaintiff.203

197
See, e.g., Gaslow v. KPMG LLP, 19 A.D.3d 264, 265, 797 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473
(1st Dep’t 2005); Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, 303 A.D.2d 249, 249,
755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003); Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F.
Supp. 2d 363, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), amended by, No. 03 Civ. 6942(SAS), 2004 WL
2403911 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004).
198
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *6.
199
See supra text accompanying notes 59–66.
200
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1.
201
Id. at *2.
202
Id. at *7.
203
Id.
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While the court’s conclusion with respect to the recovery of
taxes in New York is ultimately correct, the analysis is not. The
starting point in the court’s analysis should not have been Alpert
but rather Flynn v Judge. Under Flynn’s expectancy measure of
damages in negligence, a plaintiff may recover the difference
between what his pecuniary position would have been if the
advice received were non-negligent and his present pecuniary
situation.204 Under this standard it directly follows that any
additional taxes that would have been avoided with nonnegligent advice would be recoverable.
As to the Apple Bank court’s analysis of the recoverability of
interest, it is suggested that if the court’s starting point was
Alpert, which it was, its analysis and conclusion is incorrect. The
reason for this is because the crux of Alpert’s holding that
interest is not recoverable is because the court did not view the
payment of interest as damages. It was merely an appropriate
charge for the plaintiff’s use of the government’s tax money
during the time the plaintiff was not entitled to the money.
Under Alpert’s presumption that the value of the money to the
plaintiff always equals the interest charge paid the government,
there simply are no damages to recover. Under this analysis,
interest should never be recoverable, even when the back taxes
were avoidable with non-negligent advice.
CONCLUSION
Although I have previously stated my view that Alpert’s
holdings prohibiting the recovery of both interest on a tax
underpayment and additional taxes should be changed and that
such recoveries should be allowed in New York in negligence
causes of action, a considered analysis of Alpert must extend
beyond a simple conclusion that Alpert was wrongly decided. In
fact, Alpert was correctly decided. Alpert involved a fraud cause
of action. In deciding that additional taxes were not recoverable
and that any tax savings that could have been obtained by an
investment in another viable tax shelter was irrelevant, Alpert
was simply applying well-defined and well-established principles

204

Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d Dep’t 1912).
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governing the recovery of fraud damages in New York. These
principles were established in 1919 in Reno v. Bull205 and
followed consistently since then.206
With respect to Alpert’s holding that interest on a tax
underpayment was not recoverable, again it is impossible to
simply suggest that this holding is erroneous. In fact, the
holding was quite progressive and very perceptive of a wrong
outcome resulting from the majority view’s simplistic allowance
of the recovery of such interest as a normal element of
recoverable tort damages.207 While Alpert was addressing a fraud
cause of action, it very perceptively understood, and held, that
interest on a tax underpayment does not factually constitute
damages. The plaintiff had use of the government’s tax money
for some period of time when not entitled to the money, and
simply reimbursing the government for wrongly hypothecating
the use of the money was, according to Alpert, very appropriate.
In fact, according to the court, if such interest were recoverable,
plaintiffs would always have the unwarranted windfall of having
had the interest-free use of money. Probably the harshest
criticism possible of this portion of Alpert’s holding is that the
court was not prescient enough to recognize the criticism that
would be leveled at this result by the later, modern view.
However, Alpert represented an appropriate, evolutionary step in
the development of the law on the recoverability of such interest.
Now, that the modern view has taken root which permits the
litigants to establish precisely whether more interest was paid to
the government than was earned by having use of this money,
this view is superior to Alpert’s approach and New York should
adopt it. Arguably, this was accomplished by Jamie Towers,208
but, as indicated previously,209 Jamie Towers has been completely
overshadowed by Alpert despite the fact that it was decided later
by the same court that decided Alpert.
In contemplating the current state of New York law
governing the damages recoverable by an injured plaintiff from a
negligent tax advisor, it is most perplexing why the courts did
not, and still do not, simply apply New York’s traditional
205
206
207
208
209

226 N.Y. 546, 552–53, 124 N.E. 144, 146 (1919).
See supra text accompanying notes 105–17 and 123–35.
See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
296 A.D.2d 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dep’t 2002).
See supra text accompanying notes 44–58.
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negligence expectancy measure of damages in this area. In 1912,
Flynn v. Judge210 very clearly articulated that the measure of
damages in such negligence situations is the difference between
the plaintiff’s present economic position and what it would have
been with non-negligent performance. This negligence measure
of damages was endorsed by the New York Court of Appeals in
1990,211 and has been applied by other lower courts.212 Why have
the courts extended the holdings of Alpert, a fraud case, to the
tax malpractice area, instead of applying the directly relevant
negligence measure of damages that has been New York law for
almost a hundred years?
With respect to Alpert’s holding that interest is not
recoverable, perhaps it can be suggested that since this involved
a theory under which no damages were found to exist as a factual
matter, it was permissible to utilize this same theory even in a
negligence context.
However, there seems to be no
jurisprudential justification for taking Alpert’s holdings with
respect to taxes and transporting them to the negligence arena.
There might be one rather cynical explanation of why Alpert,
rather than long-standing negligence principles was applied in
this area, and that is to minimize potential damages faced by
errant professionals. Under Alpert additional taxes and interest
on a tax underpayment are not recoverable from a negligent
defendant, while such amounts213 would be recoverable under
traditional negligence doctrine. New York has a record of being
very protective of its defendant professionals—attorneys and
accountants—and, correspondingly, very parsimonious towards
injured plaintiffs. For instance, New York has a very strict rule
for when the statute of limitations commences in such situations.
It commences when the malpractice act was performed, despite
the fact that the injury might not be discoverable for some period
of time.214 There is no suspension of the statue while the wrong

210

149 A.D. 278, 133 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dep’t 1912).
Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 611, 556
N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990).
212
See, e.g., Sanders v Rosen, 159 Misc. 2d 563, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. 1993).
213
With respect to interest, only the interest differential should be recoverable.
214
Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 84 N.Y.2d 535, 538, 541, 644 N.E.2d 1009,
1010, 1011–12, 620 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319, 320–21 (1994); see also Williamson v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 N.Y.3d 1, 7–8, 872 N.E.2d 842, 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d
730, 733 (2007).
211
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could not reasonably have been discovered.215 Similarly, New
York has very strict privity rules limiting who may bring a
malpractice cause of action.216
Also, in a four to three opinion, the New York Court of
Appeals recently refused to modify existing principles of agency
law and the in pari delicto defense to somewhat weaken current
protection afforded to errant or negligent gatekeeper
defendants.217 The minority characterized the effect of the
majority opinion as “effectively preclud[ing] litigation by
derivative corporate plaintiffs or litigation trustees to recover
against negligent or complicit outside actors—even where the
outside actor, hired to perform essential gatekeeping and
monitoring functions, actively colludes with corrupt corporate
insiders.”218
It would be quite disheartening to imagine that New York’s
jurisprudence was being distorted simply to achieve a prodefendant, anti-plaintiff result.
In conclusion, it is rather inexplicable why Alpert’s holding
as to the fraud measure of damages was ever applied to govern
the recoverability of additional taxes in the negligence arena of
tax malpractice. As to the extension of Alpert’s no-interestrecovery rationale to the tax malpractice area, while this might
originally have seemed acceptable, or at least justifiable, not as a
matter of negligence doctrine, but as a theory addressing the
factual existence or nonexistence of damages, it no longer seems
appropriate in light of the subsequent development of the modern
approach that precisely measures any damages resulting from
the payment of interest to a government. The proper course of
action seems obvious.
New York should revert to its
longstanding traditional negligence measure of damages in the
tax malpractice segment of the negligence arena. Expectancy

215

See, e.g., Williamson, 9 N.Y.3d at 7–8, 872 N.E.2d at 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d at

733.
216

See, e.g., Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, 15 N.Y.3d 306, 933 N.E.2d 718, 907
N.Y.S.2d 119 (2010), in which the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the general
application of “strict privity” in estate planning malpractice claims, though it held
the personal representative of an estate does have privity to sue a negligent estate
planner on behalf of the estate. Id. at 309–10, 933 N.E.2d at 720–21, 907 N.Y.S.2d at
121–22.
217
Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 938 N.E.2d 941, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508
(2010).
218
Id. at 477, 938 N.E.2d at 959, 912 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
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damages should be recoverable. This would include additional
taxes as well as any interest differential between the interest
paid the government and the interest earned by the plaintiff on
the underpaid taxes.
In accordance with its longstanding
jurisprudence of requiring a plaintiff to prove his damages, the
burden of proving the amount of the interest differential should
be upon the plaintiff.

